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Gendarmes and Work Transfers Since 
the 19th Century –Balancing Professional Duty 
and Personal Freedom (*)
Arnaud-Dominique Houte (**)
The Gendarmerie –a branch of the French Armed Forces– had a high rate of geographic mobility 
during the 19th and 20th centuries. Mobility was one of the means available to oficers for managing 
their men and this meant that professional transfers were a frequent occurrence in the course of a 
gendarme’s career. These compulsory transfers were a source of considerable discontent on the part 
of the gendarmes concerned. Yet gendarmes also claimed the right to transfers for both personal 
and professional reasons. The conlict between institutional constraints and personal interests meant 
that the issue of mobility in the Gendarmerie was a “power game” and therefore subject to constant 
negotiation. This situation produced a solid set of shared values, the predominating one being the 
granting of priority based on length of service. Above all, it provided a new forum for discussion and 
one that was particularly original for such a highly structured military institution.
“When you were a gendarme, it was like being a 
bird on a wire. The order came in and that was it –you 
had to take off for a new place!” (1) This comment, 
taken from a popular novel by Clovis Hugues, was 
commonplace at the end of the 19th century. This 
phenomenon is no less surprising as Jean Le Bihan 
(2009) recently remarked. Indeed, we know that the 
higher the status of civil servants, the more often they 
were transferred. Whether this involved the “elite” 
(Charle, 1987) or, to a lesser extent, middle‑level 
civil servants (Le Bihan, 2008), mobility was the 
price they paid for prestige. Conversely, subordinate 
employees such as policemen (Deluermoz, 2009), 
customs oficers (Clinquart, 1986) or rural police‑
men (Gaveau, 2005) enjoyed stable careers from a 
geographical point of view. Although schoolteach‑
ers were frequently transferred, they rarely left their 
native region (Ouzouf, 1992). This was far from 
being the case for gendarmes, who could be posted 
anywhere in the country. (2) Indeed, this put them into 
a rather exceptional itinerant category.
Was it worth it? Let us try and understand the reasons 
for this mobility. The term “mobility” should really be 
(*) Article published in French in Travail et emploi, n° 127, 
juillet‑septembre 2011.
(**) University of Paris IV, Centre de recherche en histoire du 
xixe siècle (Research Centre in 19th Century History), Paris I 
–Paris IV ; arnaud.houte@paris‑sorbonne.fr
(1) Clovis Hugues, Monsieur le gendarme. Roman villageois, 
Paris, Charpentier, 1891, p. 268.
(2) We should note that the gendarmes generally came from the 
North‑East of France, a traditional zone for military recruitment 
and, to a lesser extent, from certain “regions of civil servants” 
(Corsica, the Pyrenees). These familiar areas are thus particu‑
larly sought after by gendarmes, who cannot all be posted to 
their own regions.
in the plural (“mobilities”) because this type of mobil‑
ity could take on many different forms as well as very 
speciic meanings. This subject has sparked relatively 
little interest among civil service historians who tend to 
focus much more on the logic dictating career advance‑
ment than on the issue of mobility itself. Indeed, this 
topic has failed to generate much more enthusiasm on 
the part of sociologists specialized in the forces of law 
and order (Dieu, 2008), who record these phenomena 
without really trying to explain them.
We need to take into account that all sources of 
research available for issues such as this are not 
equally proliic and, with the exception of some 
corporatist publications, have never been open to 
public debate. Oficial texts provide highly detailed 
accounts of transfer procedures but do not clarify 
what was at stake. In this respect, legislation was 
mainly communicated via memoranda and internal 
notes circulated on a strictly local basis. Gendarmes’ 
pension and retirement iles, which often included 
requests for transfer, provided additional insight 
into the subject. Unfortunately, the arguments used 
sound a little hackneyed, such as “personal” or 
“health” reasons. The reasons put forward are too 
vague to be used for research purposes. The infor‑
mation given by the oficers can provide occasional 
valuable pointers. Unfortunately, this was only iled 
and kept from the end of the 19th century onwards (3).
(3) We ind the main part of these notices in the “registry of 
routine correspondence” (R/2 in gendarmerie archivist jargon), 
which recorded, in summarized form, reports submitted to the 
hierarchy. By convention and to avoid overcomplicating the 
critique here, we will only indicate the date of the daily report 
in which the notice is found.
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Box 1
Prosopography of the Gendarmes in the 
19th Century
The prosopography approach, well known 
to historians and widely revived in the past few 
decades (CHARLE, 2001), is a traditional tool used 
by social historians. By drawing up a group proile 
of the members of an institution, this tool enables 
typical patterns as well as distinctive features to 
be observed. This approach does not express the 
diversity of a group by an artiicial average –on the 
contrary, it pinpoints what brings a group together 
but also what divides it.
Of course, implementing this approach depends 
on available data sources. Whereas it is often easy 
to carry out a prosopography of the upper eche-
lons (political, economic, etc.) of a group, it is tric-
kier to enquire into subordinate staff members, 
because fewer records remain. It is worth noting 
in this respect that most recent discussions and 
complementary research data focus on the use of 
private archives and indings from network analyses 
(LEMERCIER, PICARD, 2011), which are more dificult 
to use for the lower staff levels. The military are 
nevertheless an exception to this rule. Entered in 
a register (“contrôle des troupes”) since the 18th 
century (CORVISIER, 1968), they also received reti-
rement pensions, requiring individual iles to be 
opened and kept.
Other research (STRIETER, 1994) was based 
on these retirement iles containing a signiicant 
amount of personal information. However, our 
chosen starting point was the registration of ID 
numbers (“contrôle des troupes”). Even if they are 
less detailed, they do contain the essential biogra-
phical data. Above all, they are invaluable in that 
they list all the gendarmes, including those –20 to 
30% of staff– who did not pursue their career up to 
retirement age and therefore do not feature in the 
retirement iles. This mass of documentary evidence 
provides us with quite complete insight into the 
life of each individual: geographical background, 
marital status, military then civilian career, etc. 
However, some civil information is missing (family 
connections, property). We cannot underestimate 
the importance of these data (CARTAYRADE, 2003), 
but compiling them is a signiicantly more complex 
process.
The research was done for a history thesis, and 
it targeted a cross-section of 3 353 men. These were 
all gendarmes posted in 1857 then in 1889, in seven 
typical companies (Hautes-Alpes, Gironde, Hérault, 
Ille-et-Vilaine, Loir-et-Cher, Marne, Nord). Depending 
on available data, several secondary cross sections 
were added to this base if they provided comple-
mentary information.
If we want to understand gendarmes and mobil‑
ity, irstly we need to understand the big picture. 
Indeed, a transfer affected an individual as a 
whole –his professional as well as his personal 
life, his past as well as his future plans. How can 
we understand the impact of moving homes on an 
individual if we know nothing about his family 
situation or ambitions? Not to mention the place 
he is leaving and his new place of residence –we 
would need to weigh up the pros and cons of 
each… Mission impossible? Not necessarily –if 
we bear in mind the limits of this endeavour and 
certain “dead‑ends” in its subsequent analysis, we 
can nonetheless draw up a factual summary based 
on a social history of the Gendarmerie in the 19th 
century and on a prosopography research paper 
(Houte, 2010; see Box 1).
So, with the help of these two tools, the goal here 
is to understand how mobility –whether due to insti‑
tutional constraints or personal choice– affected a 
gendarme’s life. Indeed, we would like to believe 
that a transfer was not only the result of a “top‑
down” decision but that –above all– it provided 
scope for a negotiation opportunity and one where 
the individual could attempt to enter into a dialogue 
with the institution and assert his rights. In this 
respect, analysing the different types of mobility 
and the strategies behind them provides an effective 
means of gaining insight into the nature and devel‑
opment of professional relations.
First we shall gauge and explain the luctuations 
in the number of employees and the frequency of 
transfers and then we shall give a detailed presenta‑
tion of the two main reasons for mobility: interest 
of the organisation and personal grounds. We will 
then endeavour to understand the dynamics of these 
apparently contradictory approaches before exam‑
ining the trends that would take shape in the course 
of the 20th century.
Endeavouring to Gauge 
the Mobility of Gendarmes
The irst step is to measure global mobility at 
its most relevant scale, namely, the brigade. This 
roughly corresponds to the cantonal structure and 
provides a fair representation of the working and 
living community. The most effective method 
entails making a year‑by‑year comparison of the 
composition of the units. This research can be 
carried out using census records (Jourdan, 1994) or 
more targeted surveys.
A Remarkably High Turnover 
in the Number of Employees
Everything points nonetheless to a very high 
turnover of employees, as can be seen in Table 1 
below.
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External brigades 33.4% 13.0% 8.2%
District headquarters 45.6% 22.6% 0.0%
Company headquarters 50.0% 16.7% 5.4%
Department
Aisne 32.4% 8.1% 5.4%
Ille‑et‑Vilaine 35.0% 15.6% Inc.
Jura 28.2% 11.5% 11.5%
Loir‑et‑Cher 47.4% 20.5% Inc.
Hérault 44.9% Inc. Inc.
Hautes‑Alpes Inc. 7.7% 4.0%
All the brigades 37.2% 15.2% 5.0%
Number of staff 1 078 356 261
Note: Between 1898 and 1910, 37.2% of gendarmes stayed in the same 
brigade for four-year periods; 33.4% of gendarmes posted in external 
brigades stayed in the same brigade for four-year periods, etc. 
Scope and source: Statistics were drawn up using exhaustive listings, 
at regular intervals, of members of six companies for which corre-
spondence registers where kept (SHD, series E).
This means that, in the space of four years, 
two thirds of the gendarmes were no longer in the 
brigade. The remaining third did not stay for much 
longer: 15.2% stayed at least eight years in the same 
brigade and barely 5% managed to stay twelve 
years. A signiicant difference in the turnover rate 
can be observed from one location to another. For 
example, it is particularly high in the Hautes‑Alpes 
region, especially in the outposts located in isolated 
mountainous areas. The oficers were well aware of 
this and claimed special privileges (higher wages, 
food delivery, etc.) to compensate for the inhospita‑
ble nature of these regions –these claims were rarely 
met with a positive response.
“Because of the extreme severity of the climate, 
and almost without exception, gendarmes posted 
to the Briançon region request immediate transfer 
once they have served their two years. They are 
inevitably replaced by new recruits coming from 
different regions, who in turn, ask to be transferred 
as soon as possible. This is the way it’s always been 
and it will never change.” (4)
But this type of exodus also affected other regions 
with milder weather such as the Hérault or the Loir‑
et‑Cher. Even in this latter department (known for 
its easy working conditions, for its relative proxim‑
ity to Paris and above all for the high number of 
job opportunities available for retired gendarmes), 
half of the brigade staff was replaced in four years. 
The size of the living quarters was also an important 
factor: employees’ departures were a little slower 
and not as sudden in the urban brigades, located 
(4) Service historique de la défense (henceforth SHD) Department 
of Defence History, 5th 12, Hautes‑Alpes, 12 August 1903. See 
also L’Écho de la Gendarmerie of September 29th 1901.
in territorial administrative centres and districts 
(chef-lieu de compagnie et d’arrondissement) that 
were less isolated and better supported by the other 
administrations.
That said, staff turnover remained nonetheless 
high in the Gendarmerie as a whole. A variety of 
factors can easily explain this general phenomenon: 
retirement, death, resignation, as well as regular 
compulsory transfers. But it is these compulsory 
transfers that came in for the most criticism and were 
the main source of worry for oficers. “Changes of 
residence should be drastically limited as they are 
always harmful to the service”, explained Squadron 
Chief Lebouvier in 1860, (5) echoing the statements 
of the Pontoise sous-préfet (regional government 
oficial): “Supervision would be more effective 
without recurring transfers that increase the turno‑
ver and disorganize the Gendarmerie Brigades.” (6)
It is easier to view mobility as a whole rather 
than on a case‑by‑case basis. Either available data 
is scattered and individual records tracing the career 
path of each gendarme do not give full details of 
their movements or –if and when they do– these are 
not suficiently detailed. Transfers were only auto‑
matically recorded when these involved changing 
companies –and this was not the most frequent case 
(see Table 2).






























Worked in one 
posting
10.4% 12.3% 0.0% 0,0%
Worked in two 
postings
27.4% 29.8% 14.3% 0.0%
Worked in three 
postings 
20.7% 14.9% 28.6% 35.7%
Worked in four 
postings or more
41.5% 43.0% 57.1% 64.3%
Number of staff 135 114 7 14
Note: 10.4% of gendarmes worked in only one posting; 12.3% of 
gendarmes (excluding non-commissioned oficers) worked in only 
one posting, etc.
Scope and source: The data used are based on a sample of 
gendarmes and one non-commissioned oficer. Full details of their 
careers are to be found in the summaries kept in their pension iles 
(SHD, série Yf).
We can only therefore provide a rough estimation 
based on approximately one hundred individuals for 
whom complete data of their movements is available. 
When we cross‑reference this scanty sample with 
the quality assessments of oficers, we can conclude 
(5) SHD, 1M 2003, notes from Squadron Leader Lebouvier 
sent to Napoléon III, May 25th 1860.
(6) Quoted by L. Saurel, La Gendarmerie dans la société de 
la Seconde République et du Second Empire, PhD, Paris, 1957 
t. 2. p. 119.
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that a vast majority of gendarmes had been trans‑
ferred between two and four times in the course of 
a career spanning ifteen to twenty years. Here it is 
easier to identify a trend: already a rare occurrence 
in the middle of the 19th century, (7) gendarmes who 
stayed in their irst posting belonged to a category 
that had become extinct at the turn of the century. 
Conversely, those who had served in at least four 
brigades gained a slight majority.
Conlicting Explanations
This igure increases for senior ranking ofic‑
ers. Let us put aside the oficers at middle to senior 
civil servant level and for whom mobility was 
more frequent and routine (Serman, 1994). In their 
capacity of brigadiers or barrack masters, brigade 
commanders could be considered to have more in 
common with regular gendarmes in terms of social 
background and standard of living. Interestingly 
enough, a signiicant number of gendarmes with 
the best appraisals refused promotion, as the advan‑
tages of such promotions did not signiicantly 
outweigh the responsibilities that went with them. 
The unwillingness of these gendarmes was mainly 
linked to the nomadic existence that often went hand 
in hand with the position of brigade chief. Figures 
provide a clearer picture –in the second half of the 
19th century, deputy oficers were transferred four 
times in the course of their short career.
The fact is that a promotion invariably entailed 
geographical transfer. It is understandable that both 
gendarmes appointed to lead a brigade and deputy 
oficers considered for promotion needed to leave 
their former place of residence if they wanted to 
fully assert their newly gained authority. It is more 
surprising, however, that this same rule applied 
just as frequently to brigadiers promoted to barrack 
masters –in reality, the brigade chiefs’ tasks and 
responsibilities remained the same. But the pres‑
tigious postings were speciically destined for the 
highest performing oficers. If they accepted promo‑
tion in reward for their services, brigade chiefs had 
to be willing to take on extra responsibilities in a 
new posting. In this particular case, geographical 
mobility was simply a consequence of professional 
mobility. 
Conversely, transfers for disciplinary reasons, 
which were based on the same logic, should be 
brushed aside. The Gendarmerie Règlements sur le 
service intérieur (internal regulations) are relatively 
vague on this subject, stating that the War Ministry 
could, at the request of an oficer, transfer or move 
any soldier suspected of misconduct. In reality, 
(7) This was however the case for the majority in the 18th 
century. In the Auvergne police force, 55% of mounted 
gendarmes spent their whole career in the same position; 
cf. D. Martin, “La maréchaussée au xviiie siècle. Les hommes et 
l’institution en Auvergne”, Annales historiques de la révolution 
française, 1980, p. 103.
a variety of sanctions were applied, ranging from 
simple “admonishments” to dismissal. “Transfer of 
ofice for disciplinary measures” (expressly stated 
in oficial documents) is one of the inal stages in 
the hierarchical sequence of disciplinary measures 
applied.
This kind of sentence (disciplinary transfer) 
occurred particularly during times of political 
changeover –often unoficially. In 1885, the Minister 
for War observed “the signiicant number of changes 
of residence that were ordered by the legion chiefs” 
to sanction the enemies of the Republic. In this 
respect, he reminds us that this kind of punishment 
should only be applied “after the usual means of 
repression have been used up.” (8)
This sanction remained a rare occurrence –outside 
periods of crisis– as the institution preferred to resort 
to transfers in the interest of the organization. (9) 
These did not carry the stigma of punishment but 
in reality it amounted to the same thing. As all the 
regulations in the 19th century remind us, transfers 
could only be justiied if they were in the interest 
of the organization or “for the personal beneit of 
the gendarmes.” (10) With the exception of promo‑
tions and sanctions, these two notions encompassed 
all the reasons for transfer. As they were loosely 
deined and open to all kinds of interpretation, they 
became the focal point of negotiations between the 
institution and its members. Let us now take a closer 
look at each one of these two notions –“the inter‑
est of the organization” or “personal beneits of the 
gendarmes”.
“The Interest of the Organization” 
Or the Institutional Angle 
This irst notion “the interest of the organiza‑
tion” was usually applied in three cases. In the irst 
place, it was used to manage any changes to the 
brigade staff allocation scheme (“Brigade scheme”) 
as well as administrative amendments that led to 
staff reshufles. Between the law of 1843, which 
saw an increase in the forming of brigades and the 
1880s, which saw a marked reverse in this trend, 
the Gendarmerie signiicantly expanded its ranks. 
It was therefore necessary to transfer experienced 
military personnel to ill these new vacant positions. 
This issue had to be addressed differently at the end 
of the 19th century. The allocation of brigade staff 
remained stable, but the imminent phasing out of 
(8) Circular letter from the War Secretary to Legion command‑
ers, May 19th 1885.
(9) In certain cases, the gendarmes were recommended to ask 
for a transfer on personal grounds to pre‑empt a formal punish‑
ment, and to avoid the latter being noted in their iles; SHD, 
35E, Rennes legion, October 26th 1903.
(10) Loi de germinal an VI (Law of April 17th, 1798), 
article 177.
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the use of horses and the gradual introduction of 
the bicycle gave rise to frequent switches within 
the organization of infantrymen and mounted 
gendarmes from one brigade to the other.
More often than not, oficers used the concept of 
the interest of the organization as a means of avoid‑
ing conlicts of interest. These could be triggered off 
quite easily: suspicion fuelled by a “whistle‑blower” 
or an anonymous letter, a misunderstanding with 
the city council that needed to be ironed out before 
things went sour…
These transfers were preventative measures as 
opposed to sanctions, even if the two motives often 
overlapped. There again, in the 19th century there 
was a move towards increased awareness of the 
“risk of compromise”. A circular dated 13th June 
1868 strongly recommended keeping an eye on 
men who got married in the canton where they were 
working: any gendarme who announced his engage‑
ment had to be warned of the risk of automatic 
transfer the day after the wedding. The policy of 
maximum geographic mobility was clear: appoint‑
ing a gendarme in his own region was out of the 
question. (11)
Finally, there is a less well deined and more 
varied category of transfers for supervisory 
purposes. For example, company commanders 
received verbal instructions to appoint their best 
gendarmes to “sensitive positions” or to relocate 
their “ine soldiers” to urban postings where they 
would make a better impression than “decrepit and 
ageing gendarmes.” (12) Company commanders also 
received more formal instructions to organize their 
staff in such a way that bilingual gendarmes were 
given border postings. These are just some of many 
examples, but it goes without saying that this oppor‑
tunity to transfer gendarmes was a powerful lever 
and one that was not tightly controlled.
Providing these transfers took place within a 
company or even within a legion (which covered 
three to six departments), the chief colonel of the 
legion had sole responsibility for these. In practice, 
he carried out the orders of his company comman‑
dants. One barrack master who was pressured to 
resign by his superiors spoke out against the abusive 
and arbitrary nature of transfers in the so‑called 
interest of the organization. He had been transferred 
ive times in three years! (13)
This type of protest was by no means rare –on the 
contrary. However, gendarmes’ voices were seldom 
heard. Only the constant rotation of gendarmes 
who were transferred due to their anti‑republican 
(11) The fact is that none of the 3,353 gendarmes in the pros‑
opographic sample was assigned to their native canton.
(12) SHD, 5E 6, Hautes‑Alpes, February 2nd, 1902.
(13) Plainte d’un maréchal des logis de la gendarmerie adres-
sée au Sénat pour demander réparation des injustices dont il a 
été victime, Paris, Vve St‑Aubin éditions, 1865.
tendencies attracted signiicant attention from the 
media. In 1880, a journalist from the Figaro daily 
newspaper strongly protested against the dispropor‑
tionate amount of power given to oficers who could 
harm what was most precious to their subordinates: 
“For a gendarme, there is no worse punishment than 
changing residence: all of a sudden, he has to take 
his children out of school, cover the expenses of an 
unplanned move, change his working routine, even 
his whole life.” (14)
Even if the cost of the move was covered, the 
statutory inancial monetary compensations were 
nonetheless insuficient. Reliable sources conirm 
that these transfers were in fact “true inancial sanc‑
tions,” (15) all the more so because the institution 
did not take family constraints into account. It must 
be noted that a great majority of gendarmes were 
married. (16) Contrary to irmly held common belief, 
their spouses were not excluded from the world of 
work. Even if many professions were closed to them, 
a lot of military wives worked as seamstresses and 
therefore ran the risk of losing their clientele if they 
moved. There were also shop assistants, midwives 
and a large number of schoolteachers. The predica‑
ment of the schoolteachers did however draw the 
attention of the commander of the Hautes‑Alpes 
Company. After discussion with the school inspec‑
tor, he helped speed up the process for teachers 
seeking work in areas close to their husbands’ new 
postings. (17)
However, let us put the inancial drawbacks of 
a transfer into perspective. Most chiefs requested 
and obtained exceptional inancial aid for those 
subordinates being transferred in the interest of 
the organization. As most military wives did not in 
fact have a salaried position, the inancial loss was 
limited. Finally, the free housing provided to the 
gendarme and his family meant that moving costs 
were easier to bear. We have no reason to doubt the 
sincerity of the gendarmes’ protests –why should 
we? All the same, we should bear in mind that there 
was a certain degree of exaggeration. Contrary to 
what they sometimes claimed, gendarmes did not 
necessarily dream of a sedentary position. They did, 
however, want to have a say in where they were 
sent.
(14) Janus (of Le Figaro), La Fin de la gendarmerie, Paris, 
Victor Palmé, 1880, pp. 39‑40.
(15) H. Delattre, La gendarmerie de demain, ou la gendar-
merie après la nouvelle loi militaire, Paris‑Limoges, 
Charles‑Lavauzelle, 1887, p. 17. The details vary according to 
each department, but generally the gendarmes only received a 
small allowance (barely 10 francs in Brittany!) and a free move 
(with a limit of 250 kg of baggage).
(16) More than 95% of the gendarmes in our sample got 
married during their career. In general, weddings took place 
after 2‑4 years of service.
(17) SHD, 5E 3, Hautes‑Alpes, August 13th, 1899.
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“For Personal reasons” 
Or Individual Grounds
Personal reasons were the second motive for 
requesting a transfer. This allowed gendarmes to get 
out of an inhospitable posting, (18) to choose a town 
suitable for their children’s schooling, etc. The most 
frequent motive, however, remained the serving of 
their own interests. We must not forget that the crite‑
ria for the irst postings were in the interest of the 
organization and could be very far removed from 
what the applicant actually wanted. This meant 
that the Gendarmerie was able to ill vacancies as 
quickly as possible while the same time prevent‑
ing new recruits from putting down roots, thereby 
ensuring their increased loyalty (Houte, 2008). The 
inevitable backlash was: “Gendarmes who were 
not fortunate enough to be posted near their home 
regions want to go back there.” (19)
To limit the inlux of requests, the irst measure 
applied by the Gendarmerie restricted chang‑
ing legions. Indeed, anyone wishing to change 
legions had to have prior authorization to leave 
his present legion and subsequent authorization 
to join another legion. The authorizations had 
to be signed by the two colonels concerned and 
approved by the general inspector. It was also 
possible, subject to oficers’ approval, to swap 
postings with a gendarme with the same grade. 
Despite its complexity, this procedure developed 
to such an extent during the Second Empire that 
the Journal de la Gendarmerie “opened, in its 
ofices, a register book where this type of request 
is compiled”, while an employee “directly answers 
questions on this matter.” (20)
Most requests for transfer were made within the 
closer ranks of the legion. At this level, all that was 
needed was a positive response from the legion chief. 
This was not without a certain number of condi‑
tions. First of all, applicants had to testify that they 
had no personal connection with the requested area. 
This condition became compulsory in the 1860s 
and was very strictly applied in certain areas. For 
example in the Cher department, an applicant apply‑
ing for transfer had to formally state the following: 
“I hereby state that there are no family connections 
on my wife’s side or my own, in either the district 
of the brigade I wish to join or the brigades in the 
surrounding districts.” (21)
(18) It was however very seldom recommended to “lee” a 
brigadier general deemed too strict, as a transfer request might 
well become a disciplinary action!; SHD, 34E 8, Hérault, June 
7th, 1907.
(19) Journal de la Gendarmerie, January 5th, 1900.
(20) Journal de la Gendarmerie, January 11th, 1865.
(21) SHD, 878 (provisional quotation), Cher, November 10th, 
1908.
The second measure aimed at limiting mobility 
applied more speciically, but not exclusively, to 
young gendarmes who were repeatedly told that 
they had to be fully drilled before even considering 
applying for a move. A circular dated 1875 formal‑
ized a time‑honoured practice when it stipulated, 
“authorization for transfer for personal reasons 
can only be given after a certain period spent in 
one location.” (22) This period was set at two years 
and despite strong objections raised in parts of the 
organization, (23) it was strictly respected and, in 
some regions, extended to three years.
The third measure obliged the applicant to prove 
the existence of an individual fund (see Box 2) if 
he wished to be transferred to another department. 
This measure restricted mobility for the younger 
gendarmes, as most of them were indebted to the 
institution during the irst three to four years of 
their career. If they wished to request transfer for 
personal reasons, they had to fully refund the cost of 
equipment. This meant paying out several hundred 
francs.
Gendarmes transferred for personal reasons 
received no inancial assistance and as a result had to 
add moving costs to this already considerable sum. 
One commandant from the Saint‑Claude arrondisse‑
ment was so affected by the “delicate situation” of 
one of his subordinates –inancially depleted by his 
move– that he requested exceptional inancial assis‑
tance amounting to 30 francs. In vain –the answer 
was: “This transfer is for personal reasons so the 
gendarme knew the score.” A certain Gendarme 
Gros was subjected to the same fate and found 
himself well out of pocket after paying 121 francs 
for moving his furniture: “Our inancial assistance 
should be reserved for gendarmes transferred in the 
interest of the organization.” (24)
It should not come as a surprise, then, that an 
institutional approach based on the interest of the 
organization prevailed over an individual approach 
based on personal reasons. Although the inter‑
est of the organization took precedence, transfer 
for personal reasons was still an option. Thorough 
examination of how these requests were dealt 
with by the oficers will give us more insight into 
the approach and the power dynamics within the 
institution.
(22) Memorandum from the War Secretary to Legion 
commanders, April 18th, 1875. This system existed from the end 
of the July Monarchy in the North and Eastern legions; SHD, 
Xf 257, report from the Inspector General to the War Secretary.
(23) Moniteur de la Gendarmerie, November 13th, 1881.
(24) SHD, 39E 44, Jura (Saint‑Claude), January 23rd, 1907; 
SHD, 3783, Indre‑et‑Loire, November 8th, 1913.
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Box 2
The Individual Fund, a Type 
of Management Tool
This measure was highly technical and therefore 
relatively unknown. Yet, in the 19th century it was one 
of the essential tools used in the Gendarmerie for 
maintaining the balance of power. To fully unders-
tand how it worked, one should remember that the 
liberal approach to the profession (which lasted 
right up to the 20th century) meant that a gendarme 
had to pay for his own equipment. Financing one’s 
own equipment –especially a horse– was the price 
to pay for the right to wear a uniform. The sums paid 
out could be the equivalent of over a year’s wages!
So it was to make access to the profession easier 
and to provide for accidents (death of a horse, etc.), 
that the organization set up an individual fund in 
1821. This was administrated at company level and 
its purpose was to inance the equipment required 
for the job. In practice, it meant that a gendarme 
started his career with a debet sometimes excee-
ding a thousand  francs. This sum was gradually 
reimbursed by making heavy deductions from his 
wages. This was not all: once the debt was paid, 
further sums were withdrawn at a slower rate until 
the fund reached its full capacity and could be used 
for further equipment requirements.
Even if he managed to stagger his expenses 
along the lines of an insurance-based model, this 
measure could be used as a means of exerting pres-
sure: a gendarme whose fund was “in the red” –as 
was the case with between a quarter and a third of 
staff– could not get either permission to marry or to 
transfer for personal reasons.
Power and Negotiation
Until 1905 at least, oficers had the power to 
postpone or reject requests for transfer for personal 
reasons. How did they wield this power? It is difi‑
cult to make a precise analysis, but the case of the 
Rennes Legion at the beginning of the 20th century 
would suggest that most requests were recorded and 
iled. This was no guarantee of a quick and success‑
ful outcome (see Table 3).
Table 3: Requests for Transfer for Personal Reasons 
in the Rennes Legion in 1903
Request for transfer 












Note: Among the 34 requests for transfer from one legion to 
another, 22 were transmitted, 8 were refused, etc. 
Source and scope: These igures have been calculated using the 
routine correspondence log of the Legion Chief (SHD, 35E 2).
There were few rejections, and these were always 
justiied. They stated mostly the risk of compro‑
mise: “As the requested brigade was only 14 km 
from Savignac‑les‑Églises, the home region of 
his wife […]” or “ […] the location of the posting 
borders on his home region –it is too close.” They 
also mention the idea of personal abilities: “A poor 
performer all round and needs to make progress”; 
“This gendarme is already too young to serve in 
his own department –he would be accepted for 
the other companies of the legion [in neighbour‑
ing departments].” In the same vein, they identify 
a certain number of sensitive postings, especially in 
brigades with the heaviest workload: young Mazéry 
was therefore “absolutely incompetent to carry out 
service in Rennes.”
Assessments were therefore based on thorough 
knowledge of the men and the locations involved. 
As Commandant Kervella reiterated in 1900 when 
asked –as were all the oficers– to explain the reor‑
ganization of the Gendarmerie, his position was that 
all the squadron chiefs should be consulted concern‑
ing any request for transfer. “This would prevent 
transferring men to areas where they have parents 
or family, or men who may not be physically able 
for service in that particular region –factors that do 
not occur to the legion chief. One such example is 
the Gap brigades. This was a place where, at certain 
time, all the old, weary, exhausted gendarmes ended 
up.” (25) Another argument supporting Commandant 
Kervella’s position: consulting the squadron chiefs 
would make it possible for the personal merits of 
the transfer applicants to be taken into account.
Although they were not included in the oficial 
regulations, the notions of merit and justice were 
very frequently mentioned in oficers’ statements. 
These statements demonstrate that transfer for 
personal reasons, offering a more pleasant place of 
residence, was seen as a reward for the dedicated 
service of a hard‑working gendarme. This reward 
system also made it possible to take other criteria 
into consideration, such as the family situation.
This is where we should consider the personal 
dimension of the power dynamics. Even if an oficer 
was distant (geographically and socially speak‑
ing) from his men, there was inevitably a certain 
degree of emotional involvement in his leader‑
ship. As numerous military regulations pointed out, 
especially during the Third Republic, the chief was 
expected to act as the paterfamilias. This meant that 
his role was not limited to judging his subordinate 
based on professional criteria –he was also responsi‑
ble for assessing his moral qualities. Let us consider 
the case of one Gendarme Berthier, who persisted in 
requesting a transfer to Paris. His oficer was reluc‑
tant to grant this for professional reasons (lack of 
(25) SHD, 5E 3, Hautes‑Alpes, May 26th, 1900.
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experience). However, his reservations were also 
based on more personal observations: “He must 
have known that his wife [a seamstress from Paris] 
would not be able to keep her clients; […] I had 
already mentioned this to him.” However, this nega‑
tive feedback was not taken into account and the 
gendarme got his transfer within a few months. (26)
In reality, the oficers’ power did not seem to 
be as substantial as the regulations would have us 
believe. On one hand, paternalism prevailed over the 
unyielding and harsh nature of the oficial rulings. 
Commandant Kervella who supposedly supported 
the principle that “transfers are not allowed until after 
ive years spent in the same place” in fact refused 
to go by this rule that was too broad‑based: “There 
are priority cases that we cannot ignore” (27) … “It is 
a question of life or death,” he wrote, concerning a 
gendarme whose “health is completely destroyed by 
the mountain climate” but had only spent one year in 
this posting. (28) There are several examples of “rule 
bending” which allowed gendarmes who got married 
in their home region to wait a few years before a 
vacancy came up in the surrounding region. (29)
On the other hand, oficers were under pres‑
sure themselves from outside the organization. It is 
common knowledge that at the end of the 19th century, 
prominent local igures, Members of Parliament in 
particular, were constantly called upon to “put in a 
good word” concerning a request or favour here and 
there … (Monier, 2007). Year after year, the general 
inspectors of the Gendarmerie repeatedly warned 
that these procedures were unworthy of military men 
and that sanctions would follow… However, these 
sanctions were all too rare and forms of immunity all 
too many! All that had to be done to ensure the chiefs’ 
leniency –and even in some cases, the fulilment of 
the request– was to swear that the politician’s help 
had not been directly requested but that a third party 
had deemed it necessary to do so. (30) 
Oficers’ power was therefore meted out and 
negotiated. This was particularly the case when 
gendarmes had to ill vacant posts. What prevailed 
was the interest of the organization, but the chiefs 
avoided upsetting their men. “Please draw lots in the 
presence of all the parties concerned to pick out the 
name of the mounted gendarme from your region 
who will be have to be relocated”, they asked a 
young oficer who was about to carry out a compul‑
sory transfer. (31) In the town of Saint Chinian, “ [for] 
a somewhat busy and dificult posting” requiring an 
experienced and qualiied man (which automati‑
cally eliminated new recruits and gendarmes who 
(26) SHD, 977, Loir‑et‑Cher (Romorantin), February 28th and 
June 30th 1903.
(27) SHD, 5E 12, Hautes‑Alpes, December 16th, 1903.
(28) SHD, 5E 6, Hautes‑Alpes, January 26th, 1902.
(29) SHD, 35E 2, Rennes Legion, July 18th, 1903.
(30) SHD, 2E 43, Aisne (Soissons), November 8th, 1903.
(31) SHD, 34E 13, Hérault, August 30th, 1911.
had been sanctioned), they ended up appointing a 
promising new recruit to the position because there 
were no volunteers. (32)
Careful research into the reasons for transfers 
proved that (see Box 3) there was general, albeit 
tacit, agreement on one simple principle: mobility 
was the prerogative of youth and transfers should 
slow down over time. Indeed, all the statistics 
conirm this: after the irst part of their careers, 
which were characterised by a rapid succession of 
transfers, gendarmes settled down in one or two 
inal postings. This “bonus” for the number of years 
served is obviously linked to the pace and lifestyle 
of the older gendarmes, but compared to other parts 
of the Armed Forces it was also one of the few privi‑
leges granted to veterans in the Gendarmerie, where 
career advancement was rare and increments for 
years of service amounted to very little.
Box 3
The Unacceptable Tyranny 
of Commander Brissaud
Squadron Chief of the Seine-et-Oise company, 
Désiré Brissaud was one of the most promising ofi-
cers of his generation. This must have generated 
a lot of jealousy, because he was subjected to an 
exceptionally thorough disciplinary enquiry in 1905. 
The General Inspector compiled around sixty testi-
monials(1) denouncing his authoritarian and inhuman 
behavior. This provides us with a rare opportunity to 
ind out what gendarmes thought about their ofi-
cers’ behaviour. 
One of the most recurring grievances expressed 
by his subordinates concerned transfers, as revealed 
by the following complaints from gendarmes who 
resigned under pressure: “I had three children and 
I wanted to change legions, but the commander 
refused without explaining why”; “He wanted me 
to move without giving me the reason and I didn’t 
want to leave because my wife was working at the 
Poudrerie de Sevran”; “He forced me to change 
postings three times in two years”; “He told me he 
would post me to the other side of the department if 
I insisted with my request for transfer”; “He moved 
me to another brigade on my iftieth birthday”, etc.
These grievances were clearly used to serve a 
certain purpose and do not accurately relect the 
facts. They do at least reveal the limits of what was 
acceptable for gendarmes and they show us that 
the drawbacks of mobility, together with retirement 
and children’s schooling issues, were among the 
most sensitive subjects –much more so than issues 
of career advancement or bonuses. An oficer who 
was too authoritarian on these sensitive issues 
risked being resented by his subordinates or even 
receiving sanctions.
(1) Brissaud ile, SHD, 10 Yd 1512.
(32) SHD, 34E 7‑8, Hérault, March 16th and May 16th, 1907.
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In the light of this, we can understand how the 
rules relating to transfer were part of a policy of 
human resources management. This policy served 
to consolidate the power of the institution itself, 
but also –and above all– to ensure the continuing 
personal investment of gendarmes in their profes‑
sion. Obviously, conlict was unavoidable, (33) but 
this was kept under control, as the Gendarmerie 
knew how to act in the interest of their veterans. 
By combining the two issues of mobility and disci‑
pline in their broader sense, one could say that the 
Gendarmerie of the 19th century served as a labo‑
ratory for a management approach which would 
become commonplace in the public sector in the 
20th century (Darbel, Schapper, 1961), as well 
as for middle management levels (Join‑Lambert, 
2001).
*  
*       *
The question is: has this model that was estab‑
lished in the second half of the 19th century withstood 
the upheavals of the 20th century? It is dificult to 
answer this question as the social history of the 
Gendarmerie is really “unchartered territory” espe‑
cially when it comes to the interwar period and the 
post‑war boom, known as the “Trente Glorieuses” 
(Luc, 2010). What we do know is that the basic 
principles have changed very little. The belief in 
compulsory mobility for gendarmes remains stead‑
fast. Accounts of “the time when gendarmes spent 
their entire career in the same posting” (34) should 
not always be taken at face value. They are more 
like a repetition of clichés than a true relection of 
reality. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the rules 
governing mobility have remained constant. Interest 
of the organization, disciplinary measures, and 
personal reasons –the same criteria can be found 
today. Only compulsory transfers still receive inan‑
cial compensation and, in the same way, transfers 
for personal reasons are still subject to a minimum 
period of residence –three years.
No doubt, slight changes can be observed. Let 
us take for example the order dated 27 June 1929 
ruling that transfer requests for personal reasons 
were governed by the conduct of the applicant: one 
(33) This was the case of Gendarme Hervé, transferred to an 
isolated rural position after 20 years of service! This transfer 
in the interest of the service probably conceals a punishment or 
a settling of scores. Whatever the case, Hervé decided to take 
early retirement. SHD, 35E 4, Ille‑et‑Vilaine, July 1st and 12th, 
1904.
(34) Account given by Claude Durang, gendarme from 1969 
until 1994, on his blog, consulted in April 2011: http://www.
durang.net/spip2/article.php3?id_article=1.
punishment was all it took to cancel a request. (35) 
Another rather controversial change is priority 
given to transfer applicants on health grounds (with 
the justiication of a medical certiicate). (36) Since 
the beginning of the decade other adjustments have 
been introduced. For example, it is now possible to 
be promoted without having to relocate geographi‑
cally. “A substantial response to a recurring request”, 
wrote the Legion Chief for the Franche‑Comté in 
2008. (37)
How many other planned reforms have been 
debated, rejected, implemented? As no speciic 
studies exist on this subject, we cannot give a dei‑
nite answer to this question but we can at least 
observe that adjustments have amended procedures 
without shaking the foundations of the model. This 
overall stability is all the more remarkable in view 
of the far‑reaching changes to the Gendarmerie in 
the 20th century. One such change is the ceaseless 
fragmentation of the units. Whereas a great major‑
ity of gendarmes in the 19th century belonged to the 
“départementale” unit, their successors are divided 
into “départementale”, “mobile” units and so on … 
and also into different sections and subsections that 
are increasingly specialised. This fragmentation 
hinders the transfer process, as the Chief of the 2nd 
Legion remarked in the 1930s. (38)
These changes do, however, offer new opportu‑
nities for career advancement. Gendarmes today, 
compared to their predecessors who for the most 
part had little or no hope of being promoted, can 
earn their extra stripes. This is why they need to 
adopt a different approach to mobility. Back in 
1928, a certain up‑and‑coming Gendarme Cazals 
did not take long to realize this when he was posted 
to “a quiet area intended for employees who were 
waiting for a peaceful retirement.” This drove him 
to make a request, backed up by a letter of recom‑
mendation, for a quick transfer to a neighbouring 
area, which offered him the opportunity to make his 
mark and move his career forward. (39)
Are twentieth century gendarmes more recep‑
tive to promises of career advancement? Are they 
willing to sacriice their geographical stability? A 
few examples would not provide ample proof of this. 
(35) It is thus that Gendarme Lallard, punished for indisci‑
pline, had to cancel his move, as his recently‑granted transfer 
was cancelled a few days before taking effect; SHD, 1D1/6, 
Lille Legion, March 7th, 1939.
(36) Especially in the case of Corsican gendarmes, who were 
hospitalized on the mainland and thus obtained a quicker repa‑
triation, paid for by the state; Simon Fieschi, L’action des 
gendarmes contre les “bandits d’honneur” corses dans les 
années 1930, Master in History, under the direction of J.‑N. 
Luc, Paris IV, 2008, p. 51.
(37) It would be beneicial to read the “moral report” written 
by the heads of unit in 2008 and published, creating quite a 
scandal, on the website Gendarmes et citoyens.
(38) SHD‑G, 303, Amiens Legion, May 16th, 1935.
(39) Marcellin Cazals, Journal de marche d’un gendarme, 
Rodez, Remy, Canitrot, 1995, pp. 13, 19‑20.
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On the one hand, mobility in general has become 
more the norm in the civil service due to the trans‑
port revolution (40) and this has altered the situation. 
On the other hand, it is equally true that the growing 
number of women on the labour market (Bergère, 
2004) has created other constraints (Bertaux‑Wiame, 
2006).
In any case, the issue of mobility is still up for 
discussion. It is mentioned in anonymous letters sent 
by Gendarmes to the national press in the summer 
of 1989 and the subject was also brought up in the 
token strikes in 2001. It is featured in the agendas 
of the CFMG (Conseils de la fonction militaire 
gendarmerie), (41) which acts as the staff advisory 
body for the Gendarmerie. Frequently referred to 
since the 19th century in professional publications, 
it continues to provide copy for the press aimed at 
retired people (d’Hautefeuille, 2007). Mobility is a 
recurring subject for discussion on the much‑visited 
forums on the “Gendarmes et citoyens” website. 
There is no doubt inally that the subject will come 
up in the negotiations concerning cooperation 
between the Gendarmerie and the Police Force. (42)
Today, just as in the 19th century, managing mobil‑
ity is a means of exercising power, and this is all the 
more signiicant that it is masked by highly techni‑
cal considerations. Despite diverging interests and 
(40) Of which we must still qualify the impact, taking into 
account the hemming in of numerous gendarmerie brigades: 
mostly situated in rural areas, they sometimes felt more isolated 
than in the 19th century! Resistance to the Carraz‑Hyest report, 
published in 1998, and which redeined the map of police 
and gendarme installations, can be partly explained through 
the gendarmes’ fear of being permanently relegated to the 
countryside.
(41) This representative body, placed under the control of the 
French Ministry of Defence was set up in 1990. Composed of 
gendarmes selected at random, its aim is to address issues relat‑
ing to working conditions in the Gendarmerie.
(42) One might say that the gendarmes did not really enjoy the 
experience of being ousted from the urban world, as certain of 
their generals had feared.
principles, both the Gendarmerie and its gendarmes 
have the same objective –achieving what we could 
call “an acceptable level of mobility” (Cerutti, 
2010) allowing the interests of the organisation 
to be served without encroaching on employees’ 
freedom. If the institution enjoys an inordinate 
degree of power because it can choose to transfer its 
members, this power should be used wisely –other‑
wise there is the risk that this tacit contract based on 
good governance will break down.
Thus we can see the emergence of a set of 
common values that legitimise the order of priori‑
ties relating to transfers: not only seniority and 
health but also professional competence and family 
reasons are commonly acknowledged, from the 
bottom of the institution upwards. The remarkably 
stable nature of these key principles, fully adhered 
to in today’s civil service, do not prevent divergence 
and conlict. This is particularly true in a military 
organisation such as the Gendarmerie, with its 
emphasis on disciplinary regulations and hierar‑
chy. Within these “silent ranks” or “the great mute 
one” (the nickname given to the French Land Army 
or Gendarmerie), (43) the issue of transfer policy 
provides a rare forum for negotiation. This shows 
the extent to which this technical issue deserves to 
attract the attention of the social sciences and also 
encourage further research.
(43) Let us recall the recent Matelly affair. The oficer of the 
same name was sanctioned for expressing his personal opin‑
ions (we would like to point out that this was when he was 
off-duty): the duty of conidentiality is not to be taken lightly in 
the gendarmerie institution; cf. Jean‑Hugues Matelly, L’affaire 
Matelly, Paris, JC Gawsewitch, 2010.
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